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REDUCING THE RECOVERY OF AVOIDABLE 
"SEAT-BELT DAMAGES": A CURE FOR THE 
DEFECTS OF WATERSON V. GENERAL 
MOTORS CORPORATION 
Paul A. LeBel* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The legal consequences of a traffic accident victim's failure 
to wear a seat belt are among the most complicated of the issues 
frequently faced in routine accident litigation.• Federal legisla-
tion now conditions the allocation of some highway funds on the 
state having an approved highway safety program to reduce the 
number and severity of traffic accidents.2 Among the features 
that a state must include within an acceptable safety program is a 
provision to encourage drivers and passengers to use seat belts.3 
Either in response to this legislation or independently, most 
states have adopted legislation that requires drivers and front 
seat passengers to wear seat belts.4 
States differ markedly, however, in the consequences they at-
• A.B., George Washington University 1971; J.D., University of Florida 1977. 
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I Among recent articles on the topic are Ackerman, The Seat Belt Defense Recon-
sidered: A Return to Accountability in Tort Law?, 16 N.M.L. REv. 221 (1986); Cochran, 
New Seat Belt Defense Issues: The Impact of Air Bags and Mandatory Seat Belt Use Statutes on 
the Seat Belt Defense, and the Basis of Damage Reduction under the Seat Belt Defense, 73 
MINN. L. REV. 1369 (1989); Schwartz, The Seat Belt Defense and Mandatory Usage: Law, 
Ethics, and Economics, 24 IDAHO L. REv. 275 (1988); Note, A Compromise Between Miti-
gation and Comparative Fault? A Critical Assessment of the Seat Belt Controversy and A Propo-
sal for Reform, 14 HoFSTRA L. REv. 319 (1986); Note, Buckling Up: How the Mandatory 
Seatbelt Law Affects the Seatbelt Defense, 17 Sw. U.L. REv. 597 (1988); Note, Tort Law 
and The Safety Belt Defense: Analysis and Recent Oregon Developments, 26 WILLAMETTE L. 
REv. 517 (1990); Comment, Plaintiff's Failure to Wear a Seat Belt Does Not Constitute 
Contributory Negligence, 40 S.C.L. REv. 237 (1988). 
2 23 U.S.C.A. § 402(a) (West 1990). 
3 !d. at § 402(b)(l)(E). 
4 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-909 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 316.614 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991); 75 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 4581 (Purdon 
Supp. 1991). Only nine states currently do not have a mandatory seat belt law. 
WASH. PosT, Sept. 20, 1991, at A25. 
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tach to a personal injury plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt. A 
number of states, as a matter of legislation or common law rule, 
refuse to give any effect to the nonuse of a seat belt. 5 Other 
states consider nonuse of a seat belt to be relevant to the acci-
dent victim's potential recovery. Courts in these states often de-
termine the effect of seat belt nonuse on the basis of two 
conceptual paradigms: the causation paradigm or the plaintiff 
misconduct paradigm. 
Under the causation paradigm, a plaintiff may not recover dam-
ages for the harm caused by the failure to wear a seat belt.6 
Among the states using the causation paradigm, some states re-
quire the plaintiff to prove that the accident injuries would have 
been suffered even if the plaintiff had worn a seat belt, while 
others require the defendant to prove that the plaintiff's injuries 
would not have occurred if the plaintiff had been wearing a seat 
belt. In either situation, the causation paradigm calls for a seem-
ingly heroic and precise fact-finding effort in identifying and ap-
portioning the various contributing factors to the harm suffered 
in traffic accidents. 
The plaintiff misconduct paradigm, on the other hand, focusses 
more directly on the plaintiff's fault in failing to wear a seat belt. 
That fault becomes the basis for calculating a comparative fault 
reduction in the damages a plaintiff can recover, or for raising a 
contributory negligence complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery, 
depending on the jurisdiction's approach to the contributory and 
comparative negligence defenses.' The plaintiff misconduct par-
adigm requires potentially complicated fact finding for determin-
ing the existence and the magnitude of the plaintiff's fault in 
failing to wear a seat belt. 
The most interesting of the recent judicial efforts to resolve 
the question how to treat an accident victim's failure to wear a 
seat belt was the decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 
Waterson v. General Motors Corporation. 8 Adopting neither the cau-
sation paradigm nor the plaintiff misconduct paradigm in its en-
5 See, e.g., VA. CoDE ANN.§ 46.2-1092 (1989). 
6 See, e.g., LaHue v. General Motors Corp., 716 F. Supp. 407,416-17 (W.O. Mo. 
1989) (under Missouri law, evidence on the causal effect of failure to wear seat belt 
is admissible; contributory negligence and mitigation of damages not available as a 
defense). 
7 See, e.g., Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Alaska 1986) (compara-
tive negligence defense contemplates inclusion of nonuse of seat belt as a relevant 
factor). 
8 Ill NJ. 238, 544 A.2d 357 (1988). The case is discussed in Note, Negligence 
- Seat Belt Defense- Failure to Use a Seat Belt Constitutes Evidence of Comparative Negli-
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tirety, the court articulated a hybrid approach that warrants 
careful attention. Courts in other jurisdictions could easily find 
the policy considerations that underlie the Waterson decision com-
pelling. Upon reflection, however, it is reasonable to come away 
from the Waterson decision with misgivings about the manner in 
which the New Jersey court implemented those considerations. 
Specifically, the formula the court adopted for calculating the ex-
tent to which a plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt would reduce 
the plaintiffs recovery is so cumbersome that other courts may 
understandably be reluctant to adopt it.9 In addition, significant 
parts of the methodology that the court employed are concep-
tually muddled and perhaps logically flawed. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court began its Waterson opinion 
with a deceptively simple announcement of the general principle 
that would govern the seat belt defense issue: "if a jury finds that 
a plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt constitutes negligence that 
contributed to plaintiff's injuries and damages, that negligence 
shall be considered in determining plaintiff's award." 10 In an 
overly-optimistic assessment of the effect that this principle could 
have on accident litigation about accidents in which plaintiffs 
failed to wear seat belts, the court commented that "[t]his princi-
ple will require only a limited expansion of the jury's responsibil-
ities in automobile accident cases." 11 
A preliminary sense of the complexity involved in the Water-
son approach to the nonuse of a seat belt can be gained from a 
consideration of the court's initial explanation of the jury's role 
in this "limited expansion" of its responsibilities: 
If a jury finds plaintiff negligent for failure to wear a seat 
belt, plaintiff's recovery for injuries that could have been 
avoided by seat belt use may be reduced by an amount reflect-
ing plaintiff's comparative fault in not wearing a seat belt. We 
refer to the damages that arise from these avoidable injuries as 
"seat belt damages." The jury may take into account plain-
tiff's negligent failure to use a seat belt only to reduce plain-
tiff's recovery for these seat belt damages. Plaintiff's failure to 
wear a seat belt will not affect recovery for injury and damages 
gence, Which May Decrease Recovery for Avoidable Damages, 102 HARV. L. REv. 925 
( 1989). 
9 The complexity of the decision is noted in Bird, Decision on Seat Belt Use Is 
Criticized: Damages Formula Too Complicated?, 122 NJ.LJ. 297, col. 4 (1988). See also 
So Complicated, 126 NJ.LJ. 1540 (1990) ("Waterson set the record for steps, either 
six or eight depending on how finely you parse it, for damage verdict calculation"). 
10 Waterson, Ill NJ. at 241, 544 A.2d at 358. 
11 ld. 
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that would have occurred regardless of whether plaintiff had 
worn a seat belt. The amount of the reduction of seat belt 
damages must fairly reflect all of the parties' contributions to 
the seat belt damages: defendant's contribution in causing the 
accident in the first place, plaintiff's contribution in causing 
the accident in the first place, and plaintiff's contribution to 
the extent of his or her injuries in not wearing a seat belt. The 
court will mold these jury findings, expressed as percentages 
of comparative fault, into the final verdict. 12 
7 
The Waterson approach thus requires an initial determination 
whether the plaintiff was at fault in not wearing a seat belt. If so, it is 
necessary to determine the amount of what the court refers to as 
"seat belt damages," that is, the damages that would have been 
avoided had the plaintiff not been at fault in failing to wear a seat 
belt. The significance of identifying seat belt damages lies primarily 
in the fact that the court's approach allows for the plaintiff's fault in 
not wearing a seat belt to be taken into account only in making a 
reduction in the recovery of those damages. 
The reduction in the amount of damages that a plaintiff may 
recover is supposed to take place according to a methodology that 
seems to be fundamentally flawed as a matter of logic but that is 
substantially more defensible as a matter of policy. The methodol-
ogy requires the judge and the jury to complete a six-stage process 
which Part I of this article explains. The Waterson approach will first 
be described in the court's language, and then displayed in a chart 
(Table 1) that shows the steps in the complex analytical process that 
ajudge and jury are required to follow. The chart presented in Ta-
ble 1 will then be used to follow the court's illustration of how its 
formula should operate, as well as to consider some additional hy-
potheticals that raise further complications in the use of this meth-
odology. Once the court's own approach has been presented, a 
critical analysis of that approach will be conducted in Part II, fol-
lowed in Part III by a revision of the Waterson methodology, which 
retains Waterson's policy choices but avoids the unnecessary and 
daunting complexity of the original decision. This article attempts 
to rescue Waterson's admirable policy conclusions from its inade-
quate methodology. In effect, then, as the subtitle indicates, this 
article offers a cure for the defects in the Waterson approach. 
12 /d. at 241-42, 544 A.2d at 358. 
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TABLE 1 
THE WATERSON FORMULA FOR REDUCING DAMAGE 
AWARDS 
Stage 1: 
Determine plaintiff's total damages 
Stage 2: 
Compare parties' fault in the collision 
a) plaintiff's fault 
b) defendant's fault 
[Note: a + b = 100] 
Stage 3: 
Calculate "seat-belt damages" 
a) damages if seat belt worn $ __ 
b) subtract 3(a) from 1 
Stage 4: 
Determine reduction percentage 
a) plaintiff's negligence re belt 
b) add 4(a) and 2(a) 
c) add 4(a) and 2(a) and 2(b) 
d) divide 4(b) by 4(c) 
Stage 5: 
____ % 
____ % 
% 
----
Reduce recovery of "seat-belt damages" 
multiply 3(b) by 4 
Stage 6: 
Award plaintiff damages 
(1) $ __ _ 
(2a) ___ % 
(2b) % 
(3) $ __ _ 
(4) ___ % 
(5) $ __ _ 
(6) $ __ _ 
II. THE WATERSON APPROACH To REDUCING RECOVERY OF 
SEAT-BELT DAMAGES 
A. The Waterson Formula 
The Waterson decision requires a reduction of an accident 
victim's recovery by the harm that would have been avoided had 
the victim not been negligent in failing to wear a seat belt. The 
court promulgated a multi-part formula to calculate the appro-
priate reduction, if any: 
(1) The jury determines total damages as if there were no 
seat belt issue at all. 
(2) The jury determines the comparative fault of each 
1991] SEAT BELT DAMAGES 
party in causing the accident and expresses those determina-
tions in terms of a percentage ... 
(3) The jury determines whether plaintiff's nonuse of a 
seat belt increased the extent or severity of plaintiff's injuries 
and whether plaintiff's nonuse of a seat belt constituted 
negligence. 
(4) The jury determines plaintiff's second-collision inju-
ries, or seat belt damages. 
(5) The jury determines the percentage of plaintiff's com-
parative fault for the second-collision injuries or seat belt dam-
ages. The court should inform the jury that plaintiff's fault for 
failure to wear a seat belt will be added to plaintiff's fault, if 
any, in causing the accident to reduce further plaintiff's award 
in an amount proportionate also to defendant's relative fault 
in causing the accident. 
(6) The court determines plaintiff's recovery by molding 
the jury's damages and negligence findings. 13 
9 
The best way to explain this formula is to examine the Waterson 
court's hypothetical illustration. To elucidate this explanation, it is 
helpful to introduce a step-by-step guide to the Waterson formula for 
calculating the plaintiff's recovery as illustrated in Table 1. 
While some of the stages presented in this formula are rela-
tively easy to understand, others are more complicated. In this ini-
tial examination of the Waterson formula, the court's decision will be 
accepted on its own terms, with a more critical analysis of some of 
the steps reserved for subsequent discussion. 
The first stage of the court's approach requires the fact finder 
to calculate the monetary value of the plaintiff's harm. This stage 
ignores the plaintiff's nonuse of a seat belt. Here, the jury simply 
determines the amount of damages for the plaintiffs legally com-
pensable injuries attributable to the accident. 
In stage two, the jury must perform a standard comparative 
negligence analysis of the accident, determining the plaintiff's and 
defendant's relative percentages of fault. The significant aspect of 
this initial comparative fault analysis, however, is that it should be 
limited to the parties' negligence with regard only to the accident 
itself, ignoring the seat belt issues. In other words, the second 
stage's comparative fault calculation looks only at what can be re-
ferred to as the "first-collision" element of the accident in which the 
plaintiff was injured. 
In addition, under New Jersey law, the second stage compara-
13 /d. at 274, 544 A.2d at 375-76. 
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tive negligence .calculation is subject to the "modified" comparative 
negligence scheme previously. adopted by the New Jersey legisla-
ture.14 Under the New Jersey Comparative Negligence Act, a plain-
tiff's contributory negligence will operate to reduce, rather than to 
bar, the plaintiff's recovery only when the plaintiff's negligence is 
not greater than the negligence of the defendant. 15 Therefore, un-
less the plaintiff's negligence in causing the accident was equal to or 
less than the defendant's negligence, the New Jesey Comparative 
Negligence Act will bar the plaintiff from any recovery. In such a 
case, there is no need to continue the Waterson formula. The terms 
of the comparative negligence statute would prevent the plaintiff 
from recovering any damages.for the harm suffered in the accident. 
If the plaintiff's claim for damages is not precluded by the 
state's comparative negligence statute, then the plaintiff's failure to 
wear a seat belt enters the analysis in the Waterson formula's third 
stage. Although Stage 3 ofTable 1 describes this as a calculation of 
what the court labelled the plaintiff's seat belt damages, this stage 
actually contains a number of related causation and fault issues that 
could be difficult to resolve in practice. 
The first. question to be asked in the third stage of the Waterson 
calculation is whether the failure to wear a seat belt constituted neg-
ligence by the plaintiff. It is, the court makes clear, only a negligent 
failure to wear a seat beit that reduces the amount of the avoidable 
damages that a plaintiff is entitled to recover. Thus, if a jury con-
cludes that a plaintiff was not negligent in failing to wear a seat belt, 
then the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt would be irrelevant in 
determining the recovery. 
As a result of this fault-based limitation on the defensive use of 
a failure to wear a seat belt, litigation that employs the Waterson 
formula can present all of the complexity associated with having to 
arrive at a fault characterization of the plaintiff's conduct in not us-
ing the seat belt. The ultimate question in making that characteriza-
tion is the reasonableness of the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat 
14 Comparative negligence schemes can be constructed along two different 
lines. A "pure" system completely replaces the contributory negligence rule with a 
comparative fault rule. In a pure system, a plaintiff whose negligence is less than 
one hundred percent responsible for the plaintiff's injuries would never be totally 
barred from recovery because of that negligence. In a "modified" system, the re-
placement of the contributory negligence rule is partial rather than total. At some 
percentage of plaintiff's negligence in a modified comparative negligence scheme, 
the plaintiff's fault will act as a total bar to recovery. A comprehensive treatment 
of this defense can be found in V. ScHWARTZ, CoMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 
1986). 
15 N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:l5-5.1 (West 1987). 
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belt. Resolution of that issue can tum on such matters as statutory 
requirements for its use, 16 the prevalence of use or nonuse in the 
community, the effectiveness of seat belts in preventing injuries, the 
nature and magnitude of the risk that seat belt use might enhance 
injuries, and any peculiar circumstances that might explain why a 
seilt belt was not worn on the specific occasion of the accident in 
which the plaintiff was injured. ' 
If the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt is deemed negligent, 
then the next question in the third stage is whether that negligent 
conduct increased the plaintiff's injuries. The underlying rationale 
for this inquiry is the common-sense notion that the plaintiff's negli-
gent failure to wear a seat belt becomes relevant only if the failure to 
wear a seat belt had some causal significance in the harm the plain-
tiff suffered. The question to ask, then, is whether the failure to 
wear a seat belt enhanced the plaintiff's injuries. 
Although this appears to be simply a causal inquiry, it might 
actually be more complex, for the preliminary decision to restrict 
the effect of the plaintiff's nonuse of a seat belt to a negligent non-
use could come into play in answering this question. The relevant 
increase in the extent of injury is the harm that is attributable to a 
negligent failure to wear a seat belt. Theoretically, at least, one can 
imagine the additional complexity that would be associated with an 
attempt to distinguish harm attributable to a negligent failure to 
wear a seat belt from harm attributable to a non-negligent failure to 
wear a seat belt. Waterson's fault-based approach to the conse-
quences of the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt would require 
the latter to be subtracted from the former before any reduction in 
the amount of recovery was to be performed. 
Nevertheless, the heart of this question in Waterson's third stage 
is a causal inquiry about the extent of the harm produced by the 
plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt, when that failure has previously 
been characterized as negligent. As with other counter-factual cau-
sation inquiries, this analysis requires a comparison of the actual 
plaintiff's if1iuries with the injuries of a hypothetical plaintiff in the 
same position as the actual plaintiff, but who was wearing a seat belt 
during the accident. 
If the plaintiff's injuries are determined to have been greater 
because of the negligent nonuse of a seat belt, the fact-finder com-
16 The New Jersey court noted lhal, al the time of the accidem from which the 
Waterson case arose, there was no legislation lhal required seal bells lobe worn, and 
lhal there was therefore no negligence per se aspect lo this comributory negligence 
issue. Waterson, Ill N.J. al 262, 544 A.2d al 369. 
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pleting Stage 3 must consider a third question that examines the 
difference between the harm that the plaintiff actually suffered and 
the harm that the plaintiff would have suffered if the plaintiff had 
worn a seat belt. The preceding inquiry in Stage 3 asked whether the 
negligent plaintiff's injuries were greater than they would have been 
had the plaintiff worn a seat belt. If they were, then the fact finder 
must now decide how much of a difference exists between the injuries 
of a hypothetical plaintiff who wore a seat belt and those of the ac-
tual plaintiff who negligently failed to wear one. The figure arrived 
at in answering this question constitutes the amount of the plain-
tiff's seat belt damages. These are the damages that would have 
been avoided if the plaintiff had exercised reasonable care by wear-
ing a seat belt, and these are the damages that will be subjected to 
the reduction in the amount of the plaintiff's recovery to be calcu-
lated according to the remaining steps of the analysis. 
The fourth stage of the Waterson formula is designed to calcu-
late the extent of the reduction that will be made in the recovery of 
the amount of seat belt damages calculated in the preceding stage. 
It is at this stage that the court appears to introduce a fundamental 
error into its methodology, but before going into that flaw in detail 
in Part II of the article, the discussion here will continue to accept 
the court's approach at face value and proceed with the analysis. 
The reduction percentage in Stage 4 is determined by con-
structing a fraction comprising different combinations of the com-
parative fault percentages that were obtained in previous stages of 
the analysis. The numerator, according to the court, consisted of 
the two distinct contributory negligence components of the plain-
tiff's behavior. As described above, those are the plaintiff's negli-
gence in causing the accident (which must be 50% or less to avoid 
the bar of the state's modified comparative negligence statute) and 
the plaintiff's negligence in not wearing a seat belt. The denomina-
tor of the fraction incorporated those two percentages plus a third 
percentage that consists of the defendant's negligence in causing 
the accident. The Waterson fraction of Stage 4 therefore consisted of 
the following elements: 
1991] SEAT BELT DAMAGES 13 
FIGURE 1 
THE WATERSON OPINION'S REDUCTION FRACTION 
Plaintiff's 
Negligence 
in Causing 
the Accident 
Plaintiff's 
Negligence 
in Causing 
the Accident 
+ 
+ 
Plaintiff's 
Negligence 
in Nonuse 
of Seat Belt 
Plaintiff's 
Negligence 
in Nonuse 
of Seat Belt 
+ 
Defendant's 
Negligence 
in Causing 
the Accident 
After the reduction percentage fraction is calculated in Stage 4, 
that fraction is then, in Stage 5, simply multiplied by the seat belt 
damages that were calculated in Stage 3. The product obtained in 
Stage 5 therefore consists of the amount of the seat belt damages 
that the plaintiff will not be allowed to recover. The court's attempt 
to separate the effects of the different ways in which a plaintiff's neg-
ligence will affect recovery will thus be implemented at this stage. 
The portion of the plaintiff's injuries that are unrelated to the plain-
tiff's failure to wear a seat belt will be unaffected by the fault in not 
wearing the seat belt, and the damages that were avoidable by rea-
sonable care in wearing a seat belt will be reduced to reflect that 
aspect of the plaintiff's negligence. 
The final stage of the process, Stage 6, calls for the court to use 
the results of this decision to arrive at a judgment that reflects this 
partial disallowance of the portion of the damages that could have 
been avoided had the plaintiff exercised reasonable care by wearing 
a seat belt. At the very least, the framing of that judgment would 
involve a subtraction of the figure produced in Stage 5 from the to-
tal damages that were determined in Stage 1. As will be demon-
strated below, however, there is another important part of the 
calculation of the damage award that must be performed at this last 
stage of the Waterson approach. 
B. Waterson's Hypothetical Illustration 
At this point in analyzing the Waterson seat belt defense 
methodology, it is probably wise to consider the simple hypothet-
ical the court used to illustrate its methodology. After the hypo-
thetical has been presented, some further refinements of the 
approach can be made and the critical analysis of this methodol-
14 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:4 
ogy can proceed. The facts from the court's hypothetical can ea:;-
ily be plugged into the step-by-step guide introduced in Table 1. 
The court's hypothetical began with the Stage 2 comparative 
negligence determination and assumed that the plaintiff was 20% 
negligent and the defendant was 80% negligent in causing the 
accident. Because the percentage of negligence was less than the 
"51% bar" of the state's comparative negligence rule, the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence did not completely bar recovery, 
and the analysis proceeded to Stage 3. 
The court next assumed that the Stage 3 calculation of the 
plaintiff's seat belt damages equalled $300,000. To determine 
how much of those damages the plaintiff may not recover, the 
court computed the reduction percentage of Stage 4, adding the 
only remaining assumption needed to complete the computation: 
the percentage of the plaintiff's negligence in failing to wear a 
seat belt. That figure, the court hypothesized, was 20%. 
Although the court failed to explain how it chose 20%, it is suffi-
cient to know the number to be plugged into the reduction frac-
tion formula. Table 2 illustrates the facts from the court's 
hypothetical showing that the plaintiff's judgment would be re-
duced by $100,000. 
Additionally, although the court does not need to spell this 
out in the Waterson opinion, the plaintiff's recovery must also be 
reduced by the plaintiff's fault in causing the accident. All that 
the Waterson methodology produces is the amount of the seat belt 
damages that are unrecoverable because of the plaintiff's negli-
gence in failing to wear a seat belt. Stage 2 of the analysis identi-
fied another instance of the plaintiff's negligent behavior -
negligence in causing the accident - that also must be consid-
ered. To give full effect to the comparative negligence doctrine, 
the final calculation of the plaintiff's award must include a reduc-
tion of the damages that were unrelated to the plaintiff's failure 
to wear a seat belt. This reduction can be made simply by deter-
mining the first-collision damages and then reducing the plain-
tiff's recovery of those damages by the percentage of the 
plaintiff's negligence in causing the accident. 
This final step completing the Waterson methodology is illus-
trated in Table 3 by making explicit one additional fact that is 
consistent with the assumptions made in the court's own hypo-
thetical. In this "expanded" version of the court's illustration, it 
will be assumed that the plaintiff's total damages were 
$1,000,000. With this addition, we now can infer that the Stage 3 
1991] SEAT BELT DAMAGES 
TABLE 2 
THE WATERSON FORMULA FOR REDUCING DAMAGE 
AWARDS: THE COURT's ILLUSTRATION 
Stage 1: 
Determine plaintiff's total damages 
Stage 2: 
Compare parties' fault in the collision 
a) plaintiff's fault 
b) defendant's fault 
Stage 3: 
Calculate "seat-belt damages" 
a) damages if seat belt worn $ __ 
b) subtract 3(a) from 1 
Stage 4: 
Determine reduction percentage 
a) plaintiff's negligence re belt 
b) add 4(a) and 2(a) 
c) add 4(a) and 2(a) and 2(b) 
d) divide 4(b) by 4(c) 
Stage 5: 
Reduce recovery of "seat-belt damages" 
multiply 3(b) by 4 
Stage 6: 
Award plaintiff damages 
20 % 
40 % 
120 % 
(1) $ __ 
(2a) ~% 
(2b) ~% 
(3) $300,000 
(4) 331/3% 
(5) $100,000 
(6) $ __ 
15 
calculation involved a determination that a plaintiff who had been 
wearing a seat belt would have suffered $700,000 in damages. 
This sum, which is entered into the calculation in Stage 3(a), con-
stitutes what will now be referred to as the first-collision dam-
ages. The Stage 6 calculation of the plaintiff's award must 
therefore include the additional steps of multiplying the first-col-
lision damages by the percentage of the plaintiff's negligence in 
causing those damages, and then subtracting that sum from the 
plaintiff's total damages. 
In this expanded hypothetical, still accepting the court's as-
sumption that the plaintiff was 20% negligent in causing the acci-
dent, this last part of the calculation would require the court to 
multiply the first-collision damages of $700,000 by the plaintiff's 
negligence of20%, to arrive at a product of$140,000. That fig-
ure, plus the $100,000 reduction of the plaintiff's recovery of 
16 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:4 
seat belt damages, must then be subtracted from the plaintiff's 
total damages deterlllined in Stage 1, resulting in a judgment for 
the plaintiff of $'760,000. Table 3 thus presents a complete pic-
ture of the Waterson approach to the issue of what effect a negli-
gent failure to wear a seat belt will have on a plaintiff's recovery 
for injuries suffered in a traffic accident. 
At the corlclusion of its opinion, the court reiterated its con-
fidence "that juries dm follow this formula." 17 Whether that 
confidence is justified will be tested in practice. There is, how-
ever, reason ~o be skeptical. 
C. Problems in Applying the Waterson Methodology 
The three questions that must be answered in Stage 3 of the 
Waterson approach involve the jury in all of the complex and con-
troversial fact finding presented by both the causation and the 
plaintiff misconduct paradigms of nonuse. The plaintiff's behav-
ior must be characterized either as negligent or as reasonably 
careful; the causal relationship between the plaintiff's negligent 
failure to wear a seat.belt and the plaintiff's injuries must be de-
termined, and the·· difference between the plaintiff's injuries and 
those of a hypothetical seat-belted victim must be quantified. It 
is virtually certain that all of these considerations would play a 
role in an ideally comprehensive and sophisticated assessment of 
the legal significance of the nonuse of a seat belt. Nevertheless, it 
might be at le(lst somewhat disingenuous to label this a modest 
increase in the complexity of the jury's decision making process. 
Further, ther~ inay be considerable difficulty regarding the 
ability of the parties to offer evidence, particularly credible ex-
pert testimony,_ o~ the questions that are involved in the alloca-
tion of the plaintiff's injuries between seat belt damages and first-
collision damages. As an appellate court in another state said 
when looking at the evidence that had been introduced in the 
original triar of the Waterson case: 
In the case of Waterson v. General Motors Corp., ... the de-
fendant seems to have identified the ideal expert to testify con-
cerning the plaintiff's failure to wear his seat belt. This 
witness had degr~es in physics, mathematics and biomedical 
engineering and he was a senior engineer of safety research. 
He testified that the plaintiff would have suffered no injury at 
all if seat belts had been used. No expert testimony was of-
fered by the plaintiff. The jury found the plaintiff 40% com-
17 /d. at 275, 544 A.2d at 376. 
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TABLE 3 
THE WATERSON APPROACH TO REDUCTION OF DAMAGES: 
THE COURT'S ILLUSTRATION "EXPANDED" 
Stage 1: 
Determine plaintiff's total damages 
Stage 2: 
Compare parties' fault in the collision 
a) plaintiff's fault 
b) defendant's fault 
[Note: a + b = 100] 
Stage 3: 
Calculate "seat-belt damages" 
a) damages if seat belt worn 
("first-collision damages") $700,000 
(1) $1,000,000 
(2a) 20 % 
(2b) 80 % 
b) subtract 3(a) from 1 (3) $300,000 
Stage 4: 
Determine reduction percentage 
a) plaintiff's negligence re belt 
b) add 4(a) and 2(a) 
c) add 4(a) and 2(a) and 2(b) 
d) divide 4(b) by 4(c) 
Stage 5: 
Reduce recovery of "seat-belt damages" 
multiply 3(b) by 4 
Stage 6: 
Award plaintiff damages 
a) multiply 3(a) by 2(a) 
b) add 6(a) and 5 
c) subtract 6(b) from 1 
20 % 
40 % 
120 % 
$140,000 
$240,000 
(5) $100,000 
(6) $760,000 
paratively negligent. In upholding the trial court's refusal to 
grant a directed verdict for the defendant, the court found that 
the jury could reject the expert's testimony and reach its own 
conclusions concerning the effect of the collision on the plain-
tiff and the effect of her failure to use a seat belt. 18 
17 
In at least some cases, both the plaintiff and the defendant will be 
expected to introduce expert testimony about how much the plain-
18 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 565 So.2d 751, 753 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1990). 
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tiff's failure to wear a seat belt increased the plaintiff's injuries. The 
fact-finder would then be required to accept the conclusion of one 
of the confliCting experts or to reject the testimony of both and 
reach its own conclusion. Deriving the numbers to incorporate into 
the Waterson formula thus may be considerably more difficult than 
the court's presentation of its hypothetical indicates. 
Ill. "FIXING" THE FLAW IN THE WATERSON METHODOLOGY 
Even if the Waterson approach's fact-finding process is sup-
portable by credible expert testimony and the steps in the ap-
proach are capable of being performed by the average juror, the 
Waterson methodology still raises significant questions. The ma-
jor flaw in the New Jersey court's approach occurs in Stage 4 of 
the analysis as it was set out in Part I of this article. That is where 
our attention needs now turn. 
The purpose of Stage 4 is to determine the reduction per-
centage that should be made in the plaintiff's recovery of the seat 
belt damages. To calculate this percentage, the court con-
structed a fraction that consists of a numerator of the plaintiff's 
negligence percentage in causing the accident plus the plaintiff's 
negligence percentage in not wearing a seat belt, and a denomi-
nator that includes those two elements plus the defendant's neg-
ligence percentage in causing the accident. This approach may 
seem to be a reasonable way of apportioning the respective fault 
contributions to the distinct categories of injuries that the plain-
tiff has suffered. This approach, however, contains significant 
errors. 
Consider first the idea that the three elements used to pro-
duce the reduction fraction consist of percentages of fault. As-
suming that is true (although as will soon be shown, there is 
ample reason to question that assumption), then the fraction that 
the court constructed seems to be missing a necessary element. 
Because the court included the plaintiff's percentage of fault in 
seat-belt nonuse into the numerator and the denominator of the 
fraction, then one might argue that it should also have included 
in the fraction an element that reflects the defendants fault share 
regarding liability for the seat belt damages. 
The objection to the incompleteness of the court's fraction 
appears to be technically correct. The New Jersey court de-
scribed the analytical element that considers the plaintiff's negli-
gence in failing to wear a seat belt as "the percentage of 
plaintiff's fault for these [i.e., seat belt] damages that are attribu-
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table to plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt." 19 By definition, of 
course, a "percentage" is a particular share of one hundred. If 
the plaintiff's negligence in failing to wear a seat belt is, as the 
court assumes in its hypothetical, twenty percent, then there is 
another eighty percent of fault that has been ignored. 
While it is true that the defendant's negligence in causing 
the accident plays a role in the reduction of plaintiff's recovery of 
seat belt damages as the third element of the denominator of the 
court's fraction, that particular fault percentage should only 
count as the reciprocal of the plaintiff's fault in causing the acci-
dent. That reciprocal relationship accounts for the definitional 
note in Table 1 that the plaintiff's fault in causing the accident 
and the defendant's fault in causing the accident must equal one 
hundred.20 If the numerator includes two plaintiff negligence el-
ements, one for each of the plaintiff's distinct categories of negli-
gent behavior, then arguably the denominator should also 
include two elements for the defendant's negligence. Otherwise, 
plaintiff's negligence would be double-counted as compared to 
defendant's negligence. 
After acknowledging the potential flaw in the court's method 
of constructing the reduction fraction, there are two ways to pro-
ceed. The first possibility would be to "fix" Stage 4 of the Water-
son analysis in which the flaw appears. Following this course of 
action, one would say that what the court should do in Stage 4 is 
to construct the fraction by which plaintiff's recovery of seat belt 
damages is to be reduced not by using the three elements of the 
Waterson opinion, but rather in a way that consists of the follow-
ing four elements: 
19 Waterson, Ill NJ. at 273, 544 A.2d at 375. 
20 This assumes, of course, that the accident resulted from the negligence of 
only the two parties to this simple personal injury claim. 
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FIGURE 2 
A REVISED REDUCTION FRACTION THAT FIXES THE FLAW 
BUT UNDERMINES THE POLICY 
Plaintiff's 
Negligence 
in Causing + 
the Accident 
Plaintiff's 
Negligence 
in Causing 
the Accident 
Plaintiff's 
Negligence 
in Nonuse 
of Seat Belt 
+ 
+ 
Plaintiff's 
Negligence 
in Nonuse 
of Seat Belt 
Defendant's Defendant's 
Negligence Negligence 
in Causing + in Causing 
the Accident Seat-belt Damages 
The two instances of plaintiff's fault are now part of a fraction that 
includes the remainder of the whole of which each plaintiff fault per-
centage is a part. 
Now consider what happens when the factual assumptions of 
the New Jersey court's own hypothetical are plugged into this re-
vised method of determining the reduction fraction. The numera-
tor remains the same as it was in the illustration set out in Table 2: 
plaintiff's negligence in causing the accident is 20% and plaintiff's 
negligence in failing to use a seat belt is also 20%, producing a nu-
merator of 40. Now, however, instead of the denominator of 120 
that the court reached in its original approach, the denominator 
would be 200. That figure is determined by adding the two plain-
tiff's negligence figures of 20 and 20 to the defendant's negligence 
in causing the accident (80%) plus the "phantom" 80% that is the 
reciprocal of the plaintiff's negligence in nonuse of a seat belt. 
Under this method of calculating the reduction percentage, the 
plaintiff's seat belt damages would therefore be reduced not by one-
third (40 divided by 120) but rather by twenty percent (40 divided 
by 200). 
In looking at the "corrected" method of deriving the fraction 
used to reduce the plaintiff's recovery of seat belt damages, it 
should become apparent that the denominator is always going to be 
200. The "corrected" denominator consists of all the fault percent-
ages of both parties for the two distinct components of behavior (re-
garding the first collision damages and the seat belt damages in the 
second collision between the plaintiff and the interior of the vehicle) 
that produced harm to the plaintiff, and each of those components 
consists of one hundred percent. Any doubt that the court believed 
the seat belt damage component is supposed to equal one hundred 
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percent should be removed by its own declaration that "[t]he total 
fault for these seat belt damages, as for all damages, is one-hundred 
percent. " 21 
If the denominator is by definition always 200, then there is a 
much simpler way to express the effect of the "corrected" way to 
calculate the reduction fraction. A percentage-based fraction with a 
denominator of 200 is always going to produce a result that can be 
expressed as a percentage equal to one-half of the Qumerator. If 
this change in Stage 4 of the Waterson apptoaoh wert adopted, then 
the way to determine the reduction percent~ge,of the, plaintiff's re-
covery of seat belt damages would simply be to a9d t~e two plain-
tiff's negligence components and divide by two. . 
One possible source of confusion in the court'~ opinion needs 
to be recognized and avoided. In the court's hypothetical illustrat-
ing the reduction in seat belt damages,22 the two plaintiff's negli-
gence components were assumed to be equal, each being 20%. 
Although the court uses some ambiguous language,23 it is apparent, 
taking the opinion as a whole, that the equivalence of the two plain-
tiff's negligence figures is a matter of coincidence rather than 
definition. 24 
One can imagine why the court was not inclined to "correct" 
the calculation of the reduction fraction used to reduce the plain-
tiff's seat belt damages recovery of the plaintiff. Adding in the 
"missing" remainder of the one hundred percent of the negligence 
responsible for the seat belt damages would operate simply to cut 
each of the plaintiff's negligence figures in· half. The implicit 
message of that approach would be that. plaintiff's negligence 
should be taken into account in reducing the plajntiff's recovery, 
21 Waterson, Ill NJ. at 273, 544 A.2d at 375. 
22 See Table 2. 
23 The court says that: 
[i]f the jury previously found a percentage division of fault between 
plaintiff and defendant in causing the accident, the jury must be told 
that the court, when finally molding the jury findings into the verdict, 
will continue that proportion of fault when adding in the perceptage attrib-
utable to plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt. · 
Waterson, Ill N.J. at 273, 544 A.2d at 375 (emphasis added). 
24 In describing the refusal to apply the state's modified comparative negligence 
rule to the plaintiff's negligence in failing to wear a seat belt, the court used an 
example of a plaintiff who was 60% negligent in not wearing a belt. /d. at 274-75, 
544 A.2d at 376. If the two separate components of the plaintiff's negligence were 
to be treated as equal by definition, then the plaintiff's negligence in causing the 
accident would also have been 60%. If that were so, then the plaintiff's claim 
would have been barred at the completion of the Stage 2 comparis.on of the parties' 
fault in producing the collision. i 
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but that such negligence counted only half as much as comparable 
negligence by the defendant. 
Such a message would appear to be inconsistent with Waterson's 
underlying policy goal to calculate precisely the effect of the plain-
tiff's separate acts of negligence on the distinct items ofloss that the 
plaintiff suffered. The incomplete-denominator flaw in the court's 
methodology may thus appear to be necessary if the court is to be 
successful in apportioning the parties' respective percentages of 
negligence to the separate fault components that contributed to the 
plaintiff's injuries. As will be demonstrated in the next Part of this 
article, however, that appearance is illusory, and the court's goal can 
be accomplished with a methodology that both displays sound pol-
icy and provides an ease of application that is too frequently absent 
from the Waterson approach set out by the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey. 
IV. CoNSTRUCTING AN ALTERNATIVE To THE WATERSON 
METHODOLOGY THAT ADHERES To THE WATERSON 
PRINCIPLES 
"Fixing" the court's method of calculating the reduction 
fraction was described as the first course of action along which 
further consideration could proceed. But the preceding section 
of this article reveals that "correcting" the court's methodology 
can be seen as an effort that undermines the central rationale for 
engaging in the enterprise in the first place. The question that 
arises, then, is whether there is an alternative that retains more of 
the court's attempt to distinguish between the proportional dimi-
nution in liability for the seat belt damages and that for the first-
collision damages. The remainder of this article demonstrates an 
alternative approach to accomplish this goal. 
Arriving at an affirmative answer to that question requires 
analyzing some of the court's assumptions in constructing the 
fraction by which it would reduce the plaintiff's recovery of seat 
belt damages. Once those assumptions are changed, there are 
two different ways to proceed. One option at that point is to ig-
nore the primary policy considerations that drive the Waterson de-
cision. The other option will permit a court to give effect to 
those considerations, but do so in a way that avoids the method-
ological error of the Waterson opinion's approach. To appreciate 
the significance of the proposed alternative to the Waterson ap-
proach, the operation of each of those options needs to be 
understood. 
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The strongest message that emerges from the Waterson deci-
sion - indeed the driving principle of the Waterson approach -
is that the plaintiff's distinct negligent acts should be equitably 
applied to determine the share of the damages that are reason-
ably attributable to those different elements of fault. As a corol-
lary proposition, however, the court decided that the equitable 
treatment of a plaintiff's negligence in not wearing a seat belt 
would require a proportional reduction in the plaintiff's recovery 
of the seat belt damages, rather than a total bar to the recovery of 
those damages.25 . The court's ultimate goal in Waterson was 
"properly [to] isolate the damages and fault attributable to a 
plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt."26 That goal is both lauda-
ble and attainable, but the approach taken by the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey in the Waterson case needs to be modified if the 
court's ideas are to receive the favorable attention that they de-
serve from courts in other jurisdictions. 
A. Constructing An Alternative to the Waterson Methodology 
An alternative to the Waterson approach needs to be built 
around a different treatment of the Waterson court's basic dis-
tinction between the fault in causing the accident and the fault in 
failing to wear a seat belt. Within this proposed alternative, it is 
possible to conceive of an option that rejects the Waterson princi-
ples, but it is also possible to construct an option that adheres to 
those principles. Each of those options starts with the same ini-
tial steps, which are identical to the first two stages of the Water-
son analysis described above and presented in Tables 1 through 
3. 
The first step in the proposed alternative requires the jury to 
determine the total sum of the damages that would compensate 
the plaintiff for the injuries suffered in the accident. As in the 
Waterson approach itself, no distinction is drawn at this step be-
tween damages that result from negligence in causing the acci-
dent and damages that result from a negligent failure to wear a 
seat belt. 
The second step of the proposed alternative similarly asks 
the jury to apportion the parties' fault in causing the accident. In 
25 /d. at 275, 544 A.2d at 376. The court stated that the reduction percentage 
derived from the fifth step of its approach would not bar the plaintiff's recovery 
"even if plaintiff was more than fifty percent at fault for causing the second-colli-
sion injuries, after the calculation made in step 5." /d. at 274, 544 A.2d at 376. 
26 /d. (emphasis in original). 
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a state with a modified, as opposed to a pure, comparative negli-
gence system, if the jury finds that the plaintiff's fault percentage 
exceeds the statutory threshold, the plaintiff would recover noth-
ing. As with Waterson, therefore, the analysis could in some cases 
stop at this point with a judgment being entered for the 
defendant. 
In the proposed alternative to Waterson, the third step would 
focus exclusively on an apportionment of the plaintiff's damages 
to the two types of the plaintiff's negligence. The jury would be 
asked to divide the total damages announced in Step 1 into the 
two relevant categories: first-collision damages and seat belt 
damages. The basic conceptual device for making this appor-
tionment would remain a consideration of what injuries the 
plaintiff would have suffered had the plaintiff been wearing a seat 
belt in this accident. The valuation of those injuries is then 
deemed to be the first-collision damages, with the remainder of 
the total damages being designated as the seat belt damages. 
Notice that at this third step of the proposed alternative, the 
jury is not being asked to characterize the plaintiffs failure to 
wear a seat belt as negligent. The inquiry at this step of the anal-
ysis is more narrowly focused on causal grounds, leaving the is-
sue whether the plaintiff was at fault in failing to wear a seat belt 
for a later determination. This causal inquiry is still complicated 
and subject to controversy in particular cases, but there is no way 
to eliminate those features from a decision making process that 
attempts to be sensitive to the differences in the ways that parties 
can be at fault in their behavior. We can, however, strive for con-
ceptual clarity and a greater appreciation of the purpose of the 
decisions we ask juries to make. 
After the division between first-collision damages and seat 
belt damages has been determined in Step 3, the proposed alter-
native's next step gives effect to the plaintiff's comparative negli-
gence in causing the collision. Because the jury would have 
determined the plaintiff's fault percentage in Step 2 and the 
amount of damages that are classified as first-collision damages 
in Step 3, the next step would simply be to reduce the plaintiff's 
recovery of the first-collision damages by the plaintiff's percent-
age of fault in causing the accident. The figure of reduced first-
collision damages recovery derived in Step 4 would then be held 
for use by the court when it computes the plaintiffs award after 
the remainder of the analysis has taken place. 
The proposed alternative to Waterson would then ask in Step 
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5 the critical fault question about the plaintiff's failure to wear a 
seat belt. As was true in Waterson's original approach, that ques-
tion should be initially framed as a "whether-or-not" proposi-
tion. In the alternative proposed here, however, that is all that 
should be accomplished at this fifth step of the analysis. 
The question that then arises is what to do with the result of 
the fault characterization of the plaintiff's conduct in not wearing 
a seat belt. As described earlier, the Waterson approach requires 
the fact-finder to determine the percentage of the plaintiff's fault 
in failing to wear a seat belt. The alternative to the Waterson ap-
proach should evaluate the significance of a plaintiff's fault in 
nonuse of a seat belt in a different way. The effect of the finding 
of first-collision fault of the plaintiff would still be confined to the 
reduction in the recovery of first-collision damages. The recov-
ery of seat belt damages, however, requires something other than 
a comparative negligence evaluation of the consequences of a 
negligent nonuse of a seat belt. The consequences of that fault 
come into play in Step 6 of this alternative approach in comput-
ing the plaintiff's damages. At this point, however, there are two 
options in how to attach significance to the plaintiff's nonuse of a 
seat belt. 
B. Alternative to the Waterson Approach that Rejects the 
Waterson Principles 
As the first option, a way of calculating the plaintiff's total 
recovery that deviates from the Waterson principle of using a 
plaintiff's negligence in not wearing a seat belt as a factor that 
reduces but does not bar the plaintiff's recovery of seat belt dam-
ages. This version of an alternative approach to Waterson that is 
inconsistent with the central principles of that case is illustrated 
in Table 4. 
Under this alternative, an affirmative answer to the question 
whether the plaintiff was negligent in not wearing a seat belt 
would produce the following line of reasoning. If the plaintiff 
was negligent in failing to wear a seat belt, then the only damages 
that the plaintiff would have suffered without that additional neg-
ligence would have been the first-collision damages. If all of the 
seat belt damages were avoidable by the plaintiff's exercise of 
reasonable care, the plaintiff should recover none of the seat belt 
damages. 27 Therefore, at this final step of the process, the rea-
27 This is the main thrust of the criticism of Waterson presented in the student 
note cited earlier. See Note, supra note 8 (proposing that the court should treat 
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TABLE 4 
MODEL OF THE ALTERNATIVE TO WATERSON 
CoNSTRUCTED IN A WAY THAT REJECTS THE 
WATERSON PRINCIPLES 
Ste~ 1: 
Determine plaintiff's total damage (1) $ 
Ste~ 2: 
Compare fault in causing the accident 
a) plaintiff's negligence % 
b) defendant's negligence % 
Ste~ 3: 
Apportion damages to different causes 
a) first-collision damages $ 
b) seat-belt damages $ 
Ste~ 4: 
Reduce recovery of first-collision damages 
multiply 2(a) by 3(a) (4) $ 
Ste~ 5: 
Determine whether plaintiff negligent 
in not wearing seat belt 
Ste~ 6: 
Award damages to plaintiff 
If 5 is yes: 
subtract 3(b) and 4 from 1 (6) $ 
If 5 is no: or 
subtract 4 from 1 $ 
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soning would demand that the court complete the analysis by us-
ing a Step 6 that simply makes the comparative fault reduction of 
the first-collision damages and eliminates the seat belt damages 
entirely from the plaintiffs award. This last step would thus be 
accomplishe~ in Table 4 by subtracting from the total damages 
of Step 1 the first-collision damages attributable to the plaintiff's 
fault percentage in causing the accident that were derived from 
Step 4. None of the avoidable seat belt damages of Step 3(b) 
would be recoverable by the negligent plaintiff, and those too 
failure to wear a seat belt as negligence per se and deny a plaintiff recovery of any 
avoidable damages caused by that negligence). 
1991] SEAT BELT DAMAGES 27 
would be subtracted from the total damages as quantified in Step 
1. 
If the answer to the question whether the plaintiff was negli-
gent in the nonuse of the seat belt had been negative, then none 
of the plaintiffs seat belt damages would be attributable to that 
type of plaintiff's fault. In that situation, then, the analysis 
should be completed simply by reducing the total damages of 
Step 1 by the comparative fault reduction of the first-collision 
damages calculated in Step 4. 
Table 5 illustrates the use of this first option in the construc-
tion of an alternative to Waterson in a hypothetical case that re-
sembles the situation used to explain the Waterson approach. 
Assume as before that a plaintiff who has legally compensable 
injuries that are quantified in Step 1 at total damages of one mil-
lion dollars was determined in Step 2 to be 20 percent at fault in 
causing the initial collision. Assume further that a person in the 
plaintiff's circumstances who was wearing a seat belt would only 
have suffered injuries that amounted to $700,000. In Step 3, 
therefore, the apportionment of damages would be $700,000 in 
first-collision damages and $300,000 in seat belt damages. 
The approach that has just been outlined as the first option 
for an alternative to Waterson would reduce the recovery of the 
$700,000 in first-collision damages by the 20% of the plaintiff's 
fault in causing the accident, producing a $140,000 reduction of 
the recoverable damages. If the plaintiff was found in Step 5 to 
be negligent in not wearing a seat belt, then the computation of 
the plaintiff's judgment would be completed simply by sub-
tracting that figure from the first-collision damages and awarding 
the plaintiff the difference of $560,000. If the plaintiff's failure to 
wear a seat belt was not characterized as negligence, then the 
judgment would award the plaintiff all of the seat belt damages 
and the reduced amount of the first-collision damages for a total 
judgment of $860,000. 
C. Alternative to the Waterson Approach That Is Consistent With The 
Waterson Principles 
Finally, consider an alternative to the Waterson approach that 
is consistent with the Waterson principles. The goal in this pro-
posed alternative is to accomplish the Waterson's stated objective 
in a way that is conceptually sound and that is also easier to apply 
than the court's original approach. This alternative proceeds just 
as Table 4's first option does until the plaintiff's negligence ques-
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TABLE 5 
ILLUSTRATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE TO WATERSON 
CONSTRUCTED IN A WAY THAT REJECTS THE 
WATERSON PRINCIPLE 
Step 1: 
Determine plaintiff's total damage 
Step 2: 
Compare fault in causing the accident 
a) plaintiff's negligence 
b) defendant's negligence 
Step 3: 
Apportion damages to different causes 
20 % 
80 % 
a) first-collision damages $700,000 
b) seat-belt damages $300,000 
Step 4: 
Reduce recovery of first-collision damages 
multiply 2(a) by 3(a) 
Step 5: 
Determine whether plaintiff is negligent 
in not wearing seat belt 
Step 6: 
Award damages to plaintiff 
If 5 is yes: 
subtract 3(b) and 4 from 1 
If 5 is no: 
subtract 4 from 1 
(1) $1,000,000 
(4) $140,000 
(6) $560,000 
or 
$860,000 
tion of Step 5 is answered. The first option rejected Waterson's 
basic idea at that point by treating all of the seat belt damages 
attributable to the plaintiff's negligence in failing to wear a seat 
belt as unrecoverable. The proposed second option instead ad-
heres to the Waterson idea that a comparative fault principle 
should reduce, but not bar, the recovery of seat belt damages by 
a plaintiff who was negligent in that regard. 
The greatest conceptual flaw in the Waterson approach con-
sists of the court's conception of the plaintiff's negligence in 
nonuse of a seat belt as behavior that fits into a standard compar-
ative negligence framework. As was demonstrated earlier, that 
conception, at least as it is put into operation in the New Jersey 
court's methodology, either ignores or distorts the difference be-
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tween the percentage of fault assigned to the plaintiff's negli-
gence in not wearing a seat belt and the total percentage for that 
component of fault. The court's approach in Waterson leaves 
some percentage of the total for that element of fault unac-
counted for, or as the "phantom" percentage that does not ap-
pear in the calculation of the fraction by which the plaintiff's 
recovery of seat belt damages is to be reduced. 
That glitch in the Waterson approach seems fairly easy to 
cure. The plaintiff's negligence in not wearing a seat belt is an 
element of fault that is uniquely attributable to the plaintiff. That 
negligence is not subject to a comparison with a comparable fault of the 
defendant. While it is conceptually meaningful to speak of an ap-
portionment of 20% of first-collision damages to the plaintiff, for 
example, and 80% to the defendant, that apportionment is con-
ceptually muddled when applied to seat belt damages. Seat-belt 
damages are attributable on an ali-or-nothing basis to the plain-
tiff's decision not to wear a seat belt. If the belt had been worn, 
none of those damages would have occurred. Because the belt 
was not worn, all of those damages were suffered by the plaintiff. 
Unlike the conduct that gave rise to the accident itself, in which 
the fault of both parties contributed to the collision, there is no 
fault on the part of the defendant that specifically corresponds to 
the fault of the plaintiff in not wearing a seat belt. 28 
The preferable alternative to the Waterson approach there-
fore needs to reflect a re-conceptualization of the significance of 
asking whether the plaintiff was negligent in failing to wear a seat 
belt. Once the jury determines that the plaintiff was negligent in 
failing to wear a seat belt, the court should adopt a method of 
analysis that proceeds along the track illustrated in Table 6. 
As Table 6 shows, the negligence characterization of the 
plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt is more complicated than it 
has been assumed in all of the previous models. The first part of 
Step 5 repeats the initial question whether the plaintiff's nonuse 
of a seat belt was negligent. The appropriate question that must 
then be asked, however, is how negligent was the plaintiff in fail-
28 Professor Robert Cochran recently made an impressive contribution to the 
scholarship on the seat belt defense. See Cochran, supra note I. A major difference 
between the proposal offered by Professor Cochran and the one presented in this 
article lies in this article's rejection of an attempt to express the plaintiff's fault in 
not wearing a seat belt as a percentage of some composite of plaintiff and defend-
ant fault. Professor Cochran's complicated method of calculating a plaintiff's fault 
percentage in causing seat -belt damages (or "exacerbation damages", as he refers 
to them) is set out in Cochran, supra note 1, at 1437-46. 
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TABLE 6 
MODEL OF THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE 
WATERSON APPROACH THAT IS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE WATERSON PRINCIPLES 
Step 1: 
Determine plaintiff's total damages 
Step 2: 
Compare fault in causing the accident 
a) plaintiff's negligence % 
b) defendant's negligence % 
Step 3: 
Apportion damages to different causes 
a) first-collision damages $ ___ _ 
b) seat-belt damages $ ___ _ 
Step 4: 
Reduce recovery of first-collision damages 
(1) $ __ _ 
multiply 2(a) by 3(a) (4) $ ___ _ 
Step 5: 
Part 1: 
Determine whether plaintiff negligent in not 
wearing seat belt 
Part 2: 
How great was plaintiff's fault in not wearing 
seat belt on a scale of 1 (slight) to 10 (severe)? 
Part 3: 
Compute reduction in recovery of seat-belt damages 
multiply 3(b) by (0.10 times Part 2) (5) $ ___ _ 
Step 6: 
Award damages to plaintiff 
subtract 4 and 5 from 1 (6) $ ___ _ 
ing to wear a seat belt. It is fundamentally misleading to attempt 
to express the answer to that question directly as a percentage of 
fault, because of the absence of a conceptually sound notion that 
there is a corresponding percentage that would represent the de-
fendant's negligence contributing to the harm from the plaintiff's 
failure to wear a seat belt. Instead, the jury should be asked in 
the second part of Step 5 to express the magnitude of the plain-
tiff's negligence in not wearing a seat belt on some basis other 
than a percentage that apportions fault between the plaintiff and 
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the defendant. The proposal offered here suggests that this mag-
nitude of fault could be stated as a position on a scale of culpabil-
ity from one to ten, with one being only slightly negligent and 
ten being severely negligent. 
This culpability scale has the advantage of allowing a case-
by-case consideration of the plaintiff's degree of fault in failing to 
wear a seat belt. It also properly (and consistently with the Water-
son principle) treats that degree of fault as conceptually distinct 
from the plaintiff's fault in causing the collision, which is handled 
separately in this proposed alternative to the Waterson approach. 
After the jury has resolved the issue of the plaintiff's fault for 
failure to wear a seat belt, the third part of Step 5 then converts 
that magnitude or degree into a reduction calcubtion that is to 
be applied only to the seat belt damages that were calculated in 
Step 3(b). The conversion is accomplished simply by taking the 
number that the jury returns in Part 2 of Step 5 and multiplying it 
by 0.10. For example, if the jury characterized the plaintiff's fail-
ure to wear a seat belt as a four on the culpability scale, the re-
duction factor for the seat belt damages would be 0.40. Part 3 of 
this fifth step would complete the calculation of the reduction in 
the recovery of seat belt damages by multiplying the seat belt 
damages figure derived in Step 3(b) by that figure. 
This proposed alternative approach concludes with a deter-
mination in Step 6 of the damages component of the plaintiff's 
award. At this point in the analysis, the only task is for the court 
to subtract the reduction in first-collision damages of Step 4 and 
the reduction in seat belt damages of Step 5 from the total dam-
ages of Step 1. 
Table 7 illustrates the consideration of the avoidable seat 
belt damages issue by applying the now-familiar assumptions to 
this proposal for a revised approach that is consistent with the 
Waterson principles. The first four steps of the illustration in Ta-
ble 7 replicate the corresponding steps of Table 5 with regard to 
the plaintiff's total damages, the apportionment of fault in caus-
ing the accident, the apportionment of first-collision and seat belt 
damages, and the extent to which the plaintiff's recovery of first-
collision damages is to be reduced. 
The multi-part analysis in the proposed Step 5 starts with the 
same question: whether the plaintiff was negligent in not wearing 
a seat belt. If the answer to that question is yes, then part 2 of 
this step asks the jury to locate the degree of that fault on a culpa-
bility scale from 1 to 10. Assume the jury decides the appropri-
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TABLE 7 
ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO 
WATERSON CONSTRUCTED TO BE CONSISTENT 
WITH THE WATERSON PRINCIPLE 
Step 1: 
Determine plaintiff's total damage 
Step 2: 
Compare fault in causing the accident 
a) plaintiff's negligence 20 % 
b) defendant's negligence 80 % 
Step 3: 
Apportion damages to different causes 
a) first-collision damages $700,000 
b) seat-belt damages $300,000 
Step 4: 
Reduce recovery of first-collision damages 
multiply 2(a) by 3(a) 
Step 5: 
Part 1: 
Determine whether plaintiff negligent in not 
wearing seat belt 
Part 2: 
How great was plaintiff's fault in not wearing 
seat belt on a scale of 1 (slight) to 10 (severe)? 
Part 3: 
(1) $1,000,000 
(4) $140,000 
7 
Compute reduction in recovery of seat-belt damages 
multiply 3(b) by (0.10 times Part 2) (5) $210,000 
Step 6: 
Award damages to plaintiff 
subtract 4 and 5 from 1 (6) $650,000 
ate figure for the plaintiff's fault in not wearing a seat belt is 7. 
That degree of fault figure is then multiplied by 0.10 to produce 
a reduction factor of 0.7, which is in turn multiplied by the seat 
belt damages figure to produce a reduced recovery of seat belt 
damages of $210,000. The judgment that is entered for the 
plaintiff who was negligent in causing the accident and in not 
wearing a seat belt is then calculated by subtracting from the to-
tal damages figure the reductions in first-collision and in seat belt 
damages determined in steps 4 and 5. In this illustration, the 
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plaintiff's $1,000,000 would thus be reduced to $650,000. This 
alternative to Waterson reflects both of the ways in which the 
plaintiff was negligent, and does so in a manner that maintains 
throughout the analysis the distinction in those categories of 
fault and the harm they caused. 
The major conceptual change involved in the proposal of-
fered here is the initial characterization of the plaintiff's negli-
gence in failing to wear a seat belt as a particular value on a scale 
of culpability rather than as a percentage of fault. Even though 
the figure used to represent that point on the scale eventually 
ends up operating in the same manner as a percentage, which is 
to determine the extent to which the plaintiff's seat belt damages 
are to be reduced, the case for making that conceptual distinction 
is both logically compelling and functionally useful. This alterna-
tive proposal allows the plaintiff's fault in not wearing a seat belt 
to be used to reduce the plaintiff's recovery for the harm that is 
attributable to that fault in a way that avoids the flaws in the 
Waterson methodology and that is relatively easy to apply. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has developed a well-de-
served reputation as one of the most thoughtful and innovative 
courts in the country in dealing with issues of tort law and injury 
compensation. Its decisions of the last decade are among the 
most sophisticated attempts to encompass the range of policy 
considerations in the routine and in the more complex tort litiga-
tion scenarios.29 The court's decision in Waterson v. General Mo-
tors Corporation could add to that reputation, but the complexity of 
the court's approach may make courts in other jurisdictions re-
luctant to follow Waterson. 
This article has criticized some of the Waterson decision's de-
tails, but that criticism ought not to detract from the substantial 
approval and admiration the court deserves for the extent to 
which it has grappled with a quite complicated issue in an impres-
sive manner. The television show "American Bandstand" used 
to have a regular feature called "Rate-a-Record," in which se-
29 See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 NJ. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984) 
(state-of-the-art evideuce admissible in failure to warn claim involving prescription 
drugs); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 NJ. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (social host liable to 
accident victim injured by guest who becomes intoxicated driver); Beshada v. 
Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 NJ. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (state-of-the-art 
evidence inadmissible in failure to warn claim involving asbestos). 
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lected members of the audience were asked to give their opinions 
on a couple of recently released songs. If I were evaluating the 
Waterson decision in a "Rate-an-Opinion" exercise, I would give it 
a 78. In an evaluation similar to that of the American Bandstand 
"record-raters" who were asked to explain their ratings, my re-
action to the Waterson opinion could easily be expressed in terms 
that those music critics might appreciate: Waterson has very inter-
esting lyrics, but it's hard to dance to. 
The purpose of this article has been to revise the Waterson 
choreography so that the significant steps that the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey has outlined can lead more easily to the goal 
that the court has identified. The attainment of that goal, which 
is a rational and equitable assessment of the legal significance of 
a failure to use an available seat belt, is worthy of careful consid-
eration by courts and policy makers in other jurisdictions who are 
grappling with the complex policy and technical questions that 
are raised by a plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt. The alterna-
tive to the Waterson approach proposed in this article should en-
courage courts in other jurisdictions to take Waterson seriously. 
